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science for realistic consideration of legal problems.) It cer-
tainly should be sent to those in high places who might put it
to good use.
PHILIP B. KURLAND *
SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE READING OF STA-
TUTES. By Felix Frankfurter. New York: The As-
sociation of the Bar of the City of New York. 1947.
Pp. 29. $1.50.
It is not surprising that Mr. Justice Frankfurter chose as
his topic for the sixth annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture
the reading of statutes. Federal judging today is almost ex-
clusively concerned with statutory material,' and- on this
subject the federal judge has become increasingly articulate,
not only because the Bar is in need of instruction on how to
treat problems of legislation, but also because the judge's
artistic urge, now that his creative common law function has
largely atrophied, is directed toward the interpretative.2
Thus, Mr. Justice Frankfurter has "gone to great masters
to get a sense of their practice of the art of interpretation"3:
Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo.
Together with these three masters, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter himself has been an exponent of the new art. He has
done as much as any one else-in his opinions as well as in
this volume-to enunciate the modern doctrine of statutory
construction.
This doctrine-though it is doctrinaire to call it such-
is that a statute must be examined, in order to "accord the
words the sense in which Congress used them,' 4 in its
total context. The search for meaning in the words of a
statute does not differ from the same search in "a wider
non-legal context. Anything that is written may present a
problem of meaning, and that is the essence of the business
of judges in construing legislation . . . . The troublesome
M ember of the New York Bar.
1. Frankfurter, "Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes" 5(1947).
2. See Frank, "Words and Music: Some Reflections on Statutory
Interpretation" 47 Col. L. Rev. 1259 (1947).
3. Frankfurter, "Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes" 9(1947).
4. Id. at 16.
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phase of construction is the determination of the extent to
which extraneous documentation and external circumstances
may be allowed to infiltrate the text on the theory that they
were part of it, written in ink, discernable to the judicial
eye."
5
The problem, then, is one of relevance, and the chief
danger is that the practitioner will have too narrow a con-
ception of what is relevant. Mr. Justice Frankfurter was
criticized when in his dissenting opinion in United States v.
Monia he stated that "the notion that because the words of
a statute are plain the meaning is also plain, is merely per-
nicious over-simplification."'3 Yet though the choice of
words may not have been happy, it is undoubtedly the doc-
trine of the Supreme Court today that no statute, no matter
how clear on its face, can be adequately construed without
the assistance of the legislative history of the act itself,7
which act, in turn, must be placed within a setting of federal
legislation generally."
But if the attorneys too infrequently look to the history of
a statute, i.e., the hearings, committee reports, debates, 9 and
too infrequently look for the crosslight shed by other statutes
previously enacted, even more rarely do they look to the sub-
sequent history of the statute. Yet the use of this subse-
quent history represents the most recent development of the
modern doctrine of statutory construction. Today what has
been said or done after the passage of a law must be weighed
against what has been said or done before the passage of the
law. Administrative interpretation of a statute-or indeed
5. Id. at 6, 8.
6. 317 U.S. 424, 431 (1943).
7. See Utah Junk Co. v. Porter, 328 U.S. 39 (1946), where the Court
recognized that if there were only the words of the statute itself,
the result it reached would be "dubious", but the legislative history
giving meaning to the provision was "decisive".
Yet, Mr. Justice Frankfurter states on p. 25 of his book, "when
Mr. Justice Holmes came to the Court, the United States Reports
were practically barren of references to legislative materials."
8. See Keifer & Keifer v. R.F.C., 306 U.S. 381 (1939); United States
v. Monia, 317 U.S.,424, 431 (1943) (dissenting opinion).
Mr. Justice Frankfurter states on p. 21 of his book: "Statutes
cannot be read intelligently if the eye is closed to considerations
evidenced in affiliated statutes . . . .
9. Mr. Justice Frankfurter warns on p. 25 that "the importance
that such materials play in Supreme Court litigation carry far-
reaching implications for bench and bar."
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silenceO-is meaningful, and, to judge from United States
v. Lovett," so is presidential interpretation of a statute
which he has signed.12 The interpretation of statutes by sub-
sequent Congresses must be set against the interpretation of
a statute by the Congress which passed it ;13 and, indeed, there
is more than a suggestion in some recent cases that the policy
of later statutes may be retroactively read into earlier ones, 4
though perhaps this retroactivity may be limited to those
statutes which like "constitutional provisions at times em-
body purposeful ambiguity or are expressed with a generality
for future unfolding."' '
How far the use of subsequent history has been taken is
shown by Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in
Estep v. United States,16 where he relied, in part, on a com-
mittee report which was issued with reference to the reenact-
ment of the statute. He found relevant to the meaning of
this statute the understanding of a committee of a subsequent
10. Perhaps "inaction" is a better word. See Federal Trade Com-
mission v. Bunte Brothers, 312 U.S. 349, 352 (1941), "But just as
established practice may shed light on the extent of power con-
veyed by general statutory language, so the want of assertion of
power by those who presumably would be alert to exercise it, is
equally significant in determining whether such power was ac-
tually conferred." Cf. United States v. American Union Trans-
port, 327 U.S. 437 (1946).
11. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
12. President Truman has adopted a practice of sending a message
to Congress narrowly construing legislation which he has signed,
but of which he disapproves. See his message to Congress to ac-
company the Portal-ta-Portal Act of 1947. 93 Cong. Rec. 5418
(1947).
13. The question remains, however, as to whether inaction by a sub-
sequent Congress constitutes "interpretation." In Helvering v.
Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940), it was held that where Congress
had not considered a previous decision of the United States Su-
preme Court as to a statutory matter, it did not adopt that de-
cision and the Court consequently was free to overrule it. On the
other hand, in Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946), the
Court split on whether the failure of Congress to pass bills intro-
duced to overrule a previous decision, constituted an adoption of
that decision. The majority concluded that the Congressional in-
action was consistent with the desire to leave the problem fluid.
14. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941); United States
v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 429 (C.C.A. 2d 1945).
15. Frandurter, "Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes" 7
(1947).
Mr. Justice Hughes in Appalachian Coal, Inc. v. U. S., 288
U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933) states: The Sherman Law, "as a charter
of freedom . . . has a generality and adaptability comparable
to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions."
16. 327 U.S. 114, 134 (1946).
19481
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Congress. But the danger of such a practice is obvious. If
the expression by a congressional committee is given too
much weight, it would allow the amendment of a law by a
committee instead of by Congress.
But .a lawyer's concern with the concrete problems of
relevance which these examples illustrate should not blind
him to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's lesson that "while courts
are no longer confined to the language, they are still con-
fined by it."'1  For Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his volume
repeats what he has so often stated from the Bench that "in
a democracy the legislative impulse and its expression should
come from those popularly chosen to legislate and equipped
to devise policy, as courts are not."'18 Though recognizing the
function of the "external" and "extraneous," he gives no
comfort to those who would use these aids as a means for
reading into a statute "their own personal views of policy." 9
And though some may deny that this philosophy of judi-
cial self-denial is possible completely to realize in practice,
nevertheless few will deny that the ideal is worthy. There
may indeed be room for the courts in some instances to act
in their age-old tradition of protecting the poor, the ignorant
and the oppressed ;20 but the performance of that function,
must never conflict with what is a court's highest duty in a
democracy: to respect the popular will constitutionally ex-
pressed.21
17. Frankfurter, "Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes" 26
(1947).
18. Id. at 29.
19. Frank, n. 2 supra, at 1265.
20. And since in our society that tradition is respected, a court, when
dealing with a statute, will not presume that the legislature has
intended to violate it. More often, indeed, a statute will be a
means for extending that tradition to a new area. See Steele v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 199 (1944): "But
we think that Congress, in enacting the Railway Labor Act and
authorizing a labor union, chosen by a majority of a craft, to re-
present the craft, did not intend to confer plenary power upon the
union to sacrifice, for the benefit of its members, rights of the
minority of the craft, without imposing on it any duty to protect
the minority."
21. See Frank, supra n. 2, at 1269, "The theory of our democratic
government is that as (subject only to constitutional restraint)
the legislature expresses the popular will, legislation is the voice
of the people." Judge Frank goes on to say that because this is
the theory of our government, courts refuse to admit that they
do make law in interpreting statutes. But in making law the
courts do not subvert the legislative function; they act as does
a conductor of music, faithful, as far as possible, to the composi-
tion, remembering, however, that the "spirit giveth life."
[V'ol. 23
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter's thesis has been best summarized
by a different judge. Judge Learned Hand too knows the
"anguish of judgment,"' 2 and though the quotation is lengthy
his exquisite language is worth repeating.23
"What then are the qualities, mental and moral, which
best serve a judge to discharge this perilous but inescapable
duty? First, he must be aware of the difficulty and the hazard.
He must hesitate long before imputing more to the 'enactment'
than he finds in ;the words, remembering that the 'policy' of
any law may inhere as much in its limits as in its extent. He
must hesitate long before cutting down their literal effect,
remembering that the authors presumably said no more than
they wanted. He must have the historical capacity to recon-
struct the whole setting which evoked the law; the contentions
which it resolved; the objects which it sought; the events which
led up to it. But, all this is only the beginning, for he must
possess the far more exceptional power of divination which
can peer into the purpose beyond its expression, and bring to
fruition that which lay only in flower. Of the moral qualities
necessary to this, before and beyond all, he must purge his
mind and will of those personal presuppositions and prejudices
which almost inevitably invade all human judgements; he must
approach his problem with as little preconception of what
should be the outcome as it is given to men to have; in short,
the prime condition of his success will be his capacity for de-
tachment. There are those who insist that detachment is an
illusion; that our conclusions, when their bases are sifted, al-
ways reveal a passional foundation. Even so; though they
be throughout the creatures of past emotional experience, it
does not follow that that experience can never predispose us
to impartiality. A bias against bias may be as likely a result
of some buried crisis, as any othei bias. Be that as it may,
we know that men do differ widely in this capacity; and the
incredulity which seeks to discredit that knowledge is a part
of the crusade against reason from which we have already
so bitterly suffered. We may deny-and, if we are com-
petent observers, we will deny-that no one can be aware of
the danger and in large measure provide against it."
RICHARD F. WOLFSON *
22. Frankfurter, "Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes" 27(1947).
23. Hand, "Thomas Walter Swan" 57 Yale L. J. 167, 171-172 (1947).
* Member of the New York Bar.
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